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Abstract. There is growing demand for cost effective and reliable floating production systems to maximize marginal and 
new deepwater fields worldwide. Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) vessels are considered to be the 
most economical and viable options to meet this demand. Yet, FPSO projects are prone to significant cost and schedule 
growth. On average, FPSOs have been reported to experience a 20% cost growth and are delayed by six months. Overruns 
and delays represent uncertainties for owners, contractors and financial institutions. In-depth interviews with twenty-three 
practitioners about their experiences with FPSO projects revealed that rework arising from design and construction errors 
were major contributors to cost and schedule growth. Key latent conditions contributing to rework are classified according 
to people, organization and project. Using retrospective sensemaking an examination of the determinant histories in a new 
build and conversion FPSO that experienced rework was undertaken. The sharing of experience(s) is deemed pivotal for 
reducing rework in future projects, particularly through the use of communities of practice that are able to stimulate situat-
ed learning to take place. A reduction in rework will not only reduce cost and schedule growth, improve operational per-
formance and augment safety. 
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Introduction 
Floating Production Storage and Offloading (FPSO) ves-
sels are a preferred system of choice for marginal, fast-
track or deepwater oil and gas field developments world-
wide (Hardie, Knowles 2000; Lombardo 2003). Pressures 
to maximize marginal and new deep-water fields, particu-
larly as a result of expanding subsea production technol-
ogies, have increased the demand for FPSOs. Logistical 
schedules for FPSO design, engineering, construction (or 
conversion) and installation have become increasingly 
over-stretched (Harris et al. 2004; Love et al. 2011a). 
Many of these developments have experienced significant 
cost and schedule growth as a result of complex commer-
cial arrangements, project management and de-
sign/operating problems (Merrow 2003a, b; Eriksen 
2010). A well-known example is the Terra Nova FPSO 
off the coast of Newfoundland in Canada, which experi-
enced multi-year and multibillion-dollar overruns (House 
2002; Brown 2004). On average, FPSOs experience a 
20% cost growth and are delayed by six months (Fu-
glerud 2010). These aforementioned overruns and delays 
generate uncertainties for owners, contractors and finan-
cial institutions (House 2002; Brown 2004). Frequently 
occurring factors that contribute to cost and schedule 
growth are (Hardie, Knowles 2000; Performance Forum 
2000; Le Cotty 2003; Brown 2004; Shin et al. 2008; 
Erikson 2010; Fuglerud 2010): 
− poor project scope definition; 
− optimistic scheduling of design, engineering and 
construction; 
− the placing of orders before engineering is complet-
ed;  
− the implementation of new technology without qual-
ification or justification; 
− insufficient operational robustness and maintainabil-
ity of engineering; 
− logistical problems with component deliveries and 
documentation when transferring to fabrication pro-
cesses; 
− fabrication yards having to build competence and 
resources during the project; and 
− poor interface management between contractual par-
ties. 
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To meet a project’s scheduled completion date, ac-
tivities are often undertaken concurrently. By exceeding 
the limits of concurrency, complexity and the probability 
of activity delay increases particularly when revisions, 
repairs and rework occur (Friedrich et al. 1987; 
McConnell 1999). Schedule pressure provides a fertile 
environment for error propagation but also reduces the 
likelihood of error detection using standard procedures 
(Love et al. 2009). Design errors deemed to be minor in 
nature are often overlooked or dismissed due to the time 
that it would typically take to correct them (Paté-Cornell 
1990).  An ‘escalation to commitment’ may prevail if any 
ambiguities are identified which may “invalidate efforts 
of the initial design and engineering that has been under-
taken” (Paté-Cornell 1990: 1214). Prevailing uncertainty 
surrounding offshore projects creates problematic plan-
ning, particularly when information is unavailable. Under 
such adverse circumstances, there is an overreliance on 
scope changes to resolve problems arising during con-
struction, installation and commissioning. 
Despite considerable advancements in the ability to 
reduce and predict the likelihood of human and organisa-
tional errors within the offshore industry (Ren et al. 2008; 
Saleh et al. 2010; Nam et al. 2011), they still occur in 
FPSOs; therefore, necessitating costly rework (Hardie, 
Knowles 2000; Vinnem 2000; Lloyd’s Register 2003; 
Love et al. 2011a). Human errors in design, fabrication and 
operation cause most, if not all serious accidents (Moan 
et al. 2002). Error driven rework can contribute to FPSO 
performance failures, especially if during the facility’s 
operation, a complete shutdown of production or with-
drawal of other services is needed (Llewellyn et al. 2002).  
In this paper, in-depth interviews with practitioners 
were undertaken to determine the latent conditions that 
contribute to rework within FPSO projects. The research 
is exploratory in nature and is the first attempt to examine 
rework in FPSOs. Thus, retrospective sensemaking is 
used to identify the general factors contributing to rework 
as well as the determinant histories for a new build and 
conversion FPSO that experienced this phenomenon.  
This followed by a discussion that suggests learning from 
experience, specifically through the establishment of 
communities of practice (CoP), can contribute to reduc-
ing and containing rework in future projects. 
 
1. Floating storage production and offloading vessels 
FPSO vessels are amongst an array of floating systems 
used to process and store hydrocarbons extracted from 
subsea fields (Figs 1 and 2). They can replace fixed pro-
duction platforms and pipeline systems which extract oil 
and gas from shallower fields or those that are not techni-
cally or commercially viable for smaller, deepwater ap-
plications. Additionally, they can receive oil produced 
from nearby platforms or subsea and process and store it 
in readiness for tanker offloading or pipeline transporta-
tion (Lombardo 2003). New build FPSOs or tanker con-
version variants which use an existing hull, can be towed 
and permanently fixed to an offshore reservoir to form a 
‘hub’, which is connected to seabed wells via flexible 
risers (Lombardo 2003). A cylindrical hull FPSO is a 
relatively recent innovation developed by Sevan Marine 
and Siemens Oil & Gas. A prominent cylindrical FPSO is 
the Sevan Hummingbird, which is currently operating in 
the North Sea (Fig. 2). 
 
 
Fig. 1. FPSO Northern Endeavour 
 
 
Fig. 2. FPSO Sevan Hummingbird 
 
A turret mooring system used enables an FPSO to 
‘weathervane’ through 360 degrees. This type of mooring 
effectively ensures that the vessel’s bow is kept pointing 
into the prevailing wind and currents, thereby minimizing 
the impact of severe inclement conditions. Often, thruster 
systems used aid station-keeping and to control the ves-
sel’s heading. Anchor wires, flexible risers and control 
umbilical’s from the seabed all reach the surface through 
the turret. External turret moorings, mounted at either the 
FPSOs bow or stern, can provide an adequate mooring 
system for moderate environments. 
FPSOs are typically preferred in frontier offshore 
regions because they do not require a pipeline infrastruc-
ture to export oil which makes installation easier, and 
Capital Expenditure (CAPEX) and Operational Expendi-
ture (OPEX) lower. In turn, these efficiency measures 
translate into quicker revenue generation and renewed 
investment and development in the field.   
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Table 1. Advantaged and disadvantages of FPSOs  
Advantages Disadvantages 
Early deployment: Can be deployed while the field is 
being developed. Cash flow is increased which enables 
greater investment in the field. 
High cost of risers: The price of a riser system connected to an 
FPSO is generally higher than the steel catenary risers used in  
conjunction with tension leg and spar platforms. 
Multi-functional usage: Can be used in conjunction with 
other offshore facilities and utilized in more than one field. 
The extensive deck area offers flexibility. 
No well access: Lacks access to wells and drilling equipment. 
Field storage: Self-contained and possesses segregated 
storage and is therefore independent of any existing struc-
ture. Can be situated in fields that are distant from existing 
facilities. Shuttle tankers can transport oil and gas to on-
shore facilities. 
High well maintenance: The subsea tiebacks associated with 
FPSOs generally bring about higher well maintenance costs. 
Disconnection: Depending on specifications and the time 
necessary, are able to disconnect within 24 hours if 
planned. 
Limited number of risers: All risers must pass through the turret 
bearing. The size of the bearing governs the number of risers that 
can pass within the turret. The production rate that can be obtained 
from a field is limited. 
Adaptive to water depths: Operate in depths of water 
ranging from 20 to 1800 m. The FPSO operating in the 
deepest water depth is the Espirito Santo FPSO from Shell 
America operated by Brazilian Deepwater Production Ltd. 
The FPSO is moored at a depth of 1,800 m in the Campos 
Basin, Brazil. The Kizomba A FPSO (was the world’s 
largest at the time of construction), with a storage capacity 
of 2.2 million barrels (350,000 m3). The cost of a FPSO 
mooring in deep water is more economical than that of 
fixed structures or tension leg platforms  
Movement and motion: Motions are too excessive to support ‘dry’ 
trees in typical applications and which require a turret mooring 
system for most environments. The turret mooring system allows 
the FPSO to weathervane around an earth-fixed mooring so that the 
vessel is in the most favourable orientation relative to wind, waves 
and current. The turret mooring system works best in environments 
where wind, waves and current are typically aligned (Lopez-Cortijo 
et al. 2003). 
Early leasing: An FPSO can be leased up-front, which can 
reduce CAPEX costs and risks for the oil company. The 
use of early leasing can also enable a field to be developed 
quickly (Hardie, Knowles 2000). 
Accommodation: Limited space for accommodation, especially for 
those who are required to take operational maintenance. Motion 
sickness for those undertaking repairs can be a problematic issue 
(Llewellyn et al. 2002). 
Extended well testing: Enable well testing to span across 
longer periods of time and thereby enhance reservoir in-
formation. 
Potential for collision: Risk of collision with supply vessels, shut-
tle tankers and passing ships. A collision accident can lead to costly 
consequences in loss of lives, damage to property and/or environ-
ment (Moan et al. 2002; Wang et al. 2003). 
Less weight sensitive: Less weight sensitive and can 
therefore be used in different fields with varying produc-
tion capacities. Production volumes can range. 
Interface management: Increased number of interfaces required 
for delivering an FPSO which include: topsides, hull, turret, moor-
ing, risers and offshore (installation, mooring, riser, hook-up, com-
missioning) (Shin et al. 2008). 
Ecological and economic: The price of an aging tanker or 
bulk vessel to be converted into an FPSO is cheaper than a 
new build. The re-use of existing marine stock leads to a 
better utilization of ecological and economic resources 
(Hardie, Knowles 2000). 
Early leasing: The traditional operator is replaced by a ‘duty hold-
er’ and the oil company’s project team by a skeleton project man-
agement group (Hardie, Knowles 2000). Experience in design and 
operations, and a technical overview of the development are lost. 
Fast tracking of design generally leaves limited time for FEED. 
Safety: FPSOs have demonstrated to be safer in terms of 
their accident records than fixed platform offshore struc-
tures. Two major accidents that arose without loss of life, 
were on the Lan Shui FPSO in 1990, and Uige FPSO in 
1999 (Vinnem 2000). 
Maintenance and repairs: Inadequate design of turret, hoses, 
production separators, set chests and hull can lead to significant 
repairs being undertaken (Lloyds Register 2003). Production and 
profit losses can arise if an FPSO is out-of-service, especially if 
repairs are required in a shipyard. 
 
1.1. FPSO project delivery 
The design, development and implementation of an FPSO 
is technically challenging and complex. Hydrocarbon 
reservoirs, for example, can vary with geographical loca-
tions and field characteristics. No two crudes are identi-
cal, although basic oil classifications (e.g. black oils, 
condensate, sweet, sour) can dictate topside processing 
options (Mueller, Roobaert 2008). In addition to slight 
differences in the oil’s properties, other factors such as 
payloads, metocean characteristics and mooring patterns 
often impact upon topside design. An FPSO project typi-
cally interfaces with the Subsea production System’s 
Umbilical, Risers and Flowlines (SURF), topsides, vessel 
and possibly a pipeline. A high degree of differentiation 
and interdependency exists between each of the afore-
mentioned elements (Hardie, Knowles 2000). A number 
of different contractors may supply the FPSO vessel’s 
major components, for example, the shipyard, mooring 
system contractor and process unit manufacturer (Alford 
1997).  
Turnkey contract strategies or hybrids thereof, form 
the cornerstone of FPSO projects (Alford 1997; Hardie, 
Knowles 2000; Harris et al. 2004; Berends 2007; Cecil 
2008). Such contracts provide single point responsibility, 
fixed contract price and completion date. The contractor 
is therefore responsible for all design and engineering 
(encompassing detailed design, Front End Engineering 
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Design (FEED) and detailing engineering), procurement, 
construction (hull), commissioning and testing activities. 
An alternative delivery approach is a ‘Modular Strategy’ 
where the oil company forms separate contracts for dif-
ferent component parts of the project such as the design, 
procurement, construction and installation. The oil com-
pany may also manage the FPSO’s marine and offshore 
operations although Cecil (2008) contends that this is 
very rare considering the project’s scale, complexity and 
associated risks involved. To mitigate risk, alliance con-
tracting is used by many oil companies who seek to share 
responsibilities with contractors and jointly improve field 
development economics. Drawing upon design and con-
struction experiences stemming from the Schiehallion 
FPSO (North West Atlantic), Green (1999) suggests that 
there is no ‘one best way’ to execute a project because 
each bespoke mix of technology and contractors is affect-
ed by different drivers.  
 
2. Rework: latent conditions and active failures 
Rework has been defined as “the unnecessary effort of 
redoing a process or task that was incorrectly implement-
ed the first time” (Love 2002). On construction and engi-
neering projects rework is a dogged issue and major con-
tributor to cost and schedule growth (Love 2002; Hwang 
et al. 2009).  On average, rework contributes to 52% of a 
total cost overrun incurred, increase schedule by 22% and 
range in cost from 5 to 20% of contract value in construc-
tion and engineering projects (Love 2002). Within oil and 
gas projects, however, there is limited knowledge about 
the causes and costs of rework. This is surprising consid-
ering that one in eight major offshore developments (with 
a CAPEX ranging from US$1 billion to US$3 billion) are 
deemed to be a financial disaster (Merrow 2003a). 
Within construction and engineering projects, re-
work has been attributed to latent conditions that reside 
within the organizational and project systems (Love et al. 
2009). Reason (1997) states that “latent conditions are to 
technological organizations what resident pathogens are 
to the human body”. At an organizational level, this may 
manifest as insufficient training, inadequate resourcing 
levels and a poor quality management focus. At a project 
level, lack of supervision, competitive tendering and con-
tracting strategy have provided fertile conditions for er-
rors to propagate (Love et al. 2011a). Latent conditions 
lay dormant within a system until an error comes to light 
but they arise because of strategic decisions taken by 
senior management, government, regulators, designers 
and key decision-makers (Roberts, Bea 2001). The rami-
fications of these decisions spread throughout an organi-
zation and project, shaping culture and creating error-
producing factors within individual workplaces (Reason 
1997). Latent conditions or ‘pathogens’ are defined by a 
number of qualities; namely (Busby, Hughes 2004): 
− they are a relatively stable phenomena that have 
been in existence for a substantial time before the 
dispute occurs; 
− before the dispute occurs, they would not have been 
seen as obvious stages in an identifiable sequence 
failure; and 
− they are strongly connected to the dispute, and are 
identifiable as principal causes of the disputes once 
it occurred. 
According to Busby and Hughes (2004) pathogens 
can be categorized as:  
− Practice – arising from people’s deliberate practices; 
− Task – arising from the nature of the task being per-
formed; 
− Circumstance – arising from the situation or envi-
ronment that the project was operating in; 
− Convention – arising from standards and/or rou-
tines; 
− Organization – arising from organizational structure 
or operation; 
− System – arising from an organizational system 
poorly designed processes; 
− Industry – arising from the structural property of the 
industry; and 
− Tool – arising from the tool’s technical characteris-
tic. 
Active failures are unsafe acts committed by people 
who are in direct contact with a system. They are charac-
terised as being elusive and often difficult to foresee but 
importantly, they cannot be eliminated by reacting to the 
event. Latent conditions and active failures combined 
engender significant error consequences (Reason 1990). 
For example, in the case of Occidental Petroleum’s Piper 
Alpha platform collapse in the UK, which occurred in 
1988 and killed 167 workers, the following incident 
compromising of several active failures would be impos-
sible to predict: 
“Workers shut down a pipeline to remove a defective 
pump, and then went off duty before finishing the job. 
They had placed a cap on the pipe when the pump was 
removed but the workers failed to tighten the bolts – 
thinking that the pipe would remain out of service until 
the new pump was installed. Somehow, the paperwork 
never reached the controller who came on duty with the 
new shift. He pressurized the pipeline not knowing about 
the temporary cap and pump replacement work in pro-
gress, which resulted in a major gas leak, and resulting 
explosion – destroying the platform” (Diekmann 2010). 
These active failures have an immediate impact and 
are committed at the human-system interface (Reason 
1997). The presence of latent conditions increase the 
likelihood that active failures will occur by generating 
local factors that promote an individual to commit an 
error or violation (Reason 1990, 1997). 
Errors can take the form of slips, lapses, mistakes 
and violations – cf. Figure 3 (Reason 1990). Violations 
constitute aberrant behaviour and are analogous to omis-
sion errors, although an error may not necessarily be 
propagated. Violations are necessary deliberate devia-
tions from standard practices (Reason 1990). Before er-
rors become apparent, participants often remain unaware 
that particular decisions, practices or procedures can have 
a dramatic impact upon project performance (Busby, 
Hughes 2004; Love et al. 2009). Unidentified errors re-
main in a perpetual state of incubation and become 




Fig. 3. Latent conditions, errors and rework (Love, Edwards 2013) 
 
an integral part of everyday work practices; upon identi-
fication, rework can commence. Design and construction 
errors that arise during FPSO maintenance and inspection 
represent the most significant and expensive failures 
(Llewellyn et al. 2002; Lloyd’s Register 2003; Marin, 
Garcia 2003; Biasotto, Rouhan 2004). Reported examples 
of design errors include (Lloyds Register 2003): 
− bow – inadequate structural design and considera-
tion of environmental loadings; 
− breakdown of coating systems – poor selection and 
application; and 
− tank – inadequate construction techniques. 
For example, inspection of ballast, cargo tanks and 
propeller shafts involves the mobilization of inspection 
teams which is both costly and timely. As FPSOs gener-
ally remain on site during the life of the field without 
being disconnected or removed from their mooring sys-
tem, dry docking is not considered to be a viable econom-
ic option. Therefore, inspections and repairs must be 
performed on-site and under continuous operation. If 
schedule or production pressure becomes a problem dur-
ing error rectification, then safety could potentially be 
compromised and accidents occur (Love et al. 2004; Goh 
et al. 2012). 
 
3. Research methodology 
To determine the causal nature of rework in FPSO pro-
jects, the ontology of ‘subjective idealism’ was adopted 
because of the limited discourse in this specific field of 
research (Farrell 1996).  For this approach, subjects con-
struct their own views and opinions on the phenomena 
under investigation based upon their experiences; an in-
clination to truth and pragmatism is deemed to prevail. 
Sensemaking is used to underpin the ontology adopted, as 
meaning is given to experience, dialogue and narratives 
about events that have occurred through a process of 
retrospection (Weick 1988, 1995). The notion of ‘retro-
spective sensemaking’ is derived from Schutz’s (1967) 
analysis of ‘meaningful experience’ where events occur 
in a moment of time and can exist in pure duration and as 
discrete segments (Hartshorne 1962; Schutz 1967).  Pure 
duration can be described as a “stream of experience” 
(James 1950, cited in Weick 1995). Experience is a sin-
gular construct and is a “coming-to-be and passing-away 
that has no contours, no boundaries and no differentia-
tion” (Schutz 1967, cited in Weick 1995).  
Experiences, however, imply distinct, separate epi-
sodes (Weick 1995). The creation of meaning from expe-
rience(s) is reliant upon a temporal process of attention 
being directed backward from specific periods in time; so 
whatever presently occurs will influence future discover-
ies when people analyse the past (Bantz, Smith 1977; 
Weick 1995; Brown 2000; Weick et al. 2005).  Further-
more, memories are events that occur in a given period of 
time, so anything that affects a person’s ability to re-
member will also affect the same sense that is made of 
those memories. With this in mind, Fischoff (1975) states 
that ‘creep determinism’ can prevail, especially “when 
people already know the outcome of a complex prior 
history as being much determinant” (Weick 1995). Con-
sequently, the nature of determinant histories can be re-
constructed differently (Weick 1995) and is akin to a post 
modernistic view as one person may experience the same 
phenomenon differently from another (Alvesson, Deetz 
1996; Kim 2002; Love et al. 2002). For example, if an 
outcome is perceived to be bad, then antecedents are 
reconstructed to emphasise incorrect actions and inaccu-
rate perceptions even if they were not influential or obvi-
ous at the time (Bantz, Smith 1977; Weick 1995). In this 
instance, retrospective sensemaking implies that errors 
should be anticipated and reduced through a process of 
‘good project management’. The future is indeterminate, 
and the past is reconstructed knowing the outcome, thus 
past events are rarely recalled exactly as they happened. 
Reason (1990) asserts that the “knowledge of the out-
come of a previous event increases the perceived likeli-
hood of that outcome” which can lead people to overes-
timate their ability to influence future events. This 
phenomenon is known as the ‘illusion of control’ (Langer 
1975).  Organizations with a strong desire and willing-
ness to reduce errors within FPSO projects, require an 
interpretation of past indeterminacy that favours order 
and oversimplifies causality (Reason 1990). This ap-
proach facilitates a meaningful context as to ‘why’ and 
‘how’ errors occurred to materialise, which provide valu-
able insights that help construct lessons for the future. 
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3.1. Data collection 
Interviews are an effective tool for learning about matters 
that cannot readily be observed (Kvale 1996) and were 
therefore utilised as the primary data collection mecha-
nism. Over a four month period, twenty-three in-depth 
interviews were conducted with a variety of personnel 
including operations managers (3), project managers (10), 
structural engineers (3), procurement managers (2), me-
chanical managers (2) and engineering managers (3). The 
research team had a direct contact point within the partic-
ipating organization that had an interest in understanding 
‘why’ and ‘how’ rework emerged in projects. For reasons 
of commercial and individual confidentially, specific 
details about the organization are not presented. The or-
ganisation’s procurement personnel were invited to par-
ticipate in the research and interviews were conducted at 
the offices of interviewees for their convenience. Inter-
views were digitally recorded and subsequently tran-
scribed verbatim to allow for finer nuances of the inter-
view to be documented. Hand written notes were also 
taken during the interview to maintain validity. The inter-
viewees’ details were coded to preserve anonymity, alt-
hough all interviewees were aware that their identities 
might be revealed from the textural narrative. The inter-
view format was kept as consistent as possible following 
the emergent themes associated with rework identified 
from the extant literature.   
The interview commenced by asking individuals 
about their experience within industry, and their current 
role within the organisation1. Interviewees were then 
invited to select a completed project they had been in-
volved with, identify a particular rework incident that had 
taken place and explain how and why it arose. Phrases 
such as ‘tell me about it’ or ‘can you give me an exam-
ple’ were asked at opportune moments when further in-
formation was required. These open questions allowed 
for avenues of interest to be pursued because they arose 
without introducing bias in the response. Interviewees 
were asked to identify the principal sources of rework 
that occurred in offshore projects and suggest strategies 
that could be used to prevent future reoccurrence. Inter-
views varied in length from one to three hours and sought 
to stimulate conversation whilst simultaneously breaking 
down any interpersonal barriers that may have existed 
between the interviewer and interviewee.  A copy of each 
interview transcript was given to each interviewee for 
comment to check overall validity and accuracy. In con-
junction with the interviews, documentary sources for 
each project discussed were provided.  
 
3.2. Data analysis 
The text derived from the interviews was analysed using 
QSR N5 which is a version of NUD*IST and combines 
the efficient management of non-numerical unstructured 
data with powerful processes of indexing and theorizing. 
QSR N5 enabled additional data sources and journal 
notes to be incorporated into the analysis as well as iden-
                                                                        
1  A copy of the research instrument used for the interviews can be 
obtained on request from the corresponding author. 
tify new emergent themes. The development and re-
assessment of themes as analysis progresses accords with 
the calls for avoiding confining data to pre-determined 
sets of categories. Kvale (1996) suggests that ad hoc 
methods for generating meaning enable the researcher to 
access “a variety of common-sense approaches to inter-
view text using an interplay of techniques such as noting 
patterns, seeing plausibility, making comparisons, etc.”. 
Using QSR N5 facilitated an organic approach to coding 
because it enabled triggers or categories of textural inter-
est to be coded and used to monitor emerging and devel-
oping ideas (Kvale 1996). These codings can be modi-
fied, integrated or migrated as the analysis progresses and 
the generation of reports, using Boolean search, facilitates 
the recognition of conflicts and contradictions. 
 
4. Sensemaking of rework in FPSOs: an exploration of 
experience(s) 
The analysis of the research findings commences with an 
overview of the interviewees experiences with rework in 
FPSO projects under the nomenclatures of project, organi-
zation and people (POP). Then two specific FPSO projects 
that experienced significant rework are examined in detail. 
Each interviewee provided intuitive estimates of re-
work costs for FPSO projects. These ranged from 10% to 
25% of CAPEX. If an Engineering Procurement and Con-
tract (EPC) contract strategy was used, a 10% cost 
growth, with 5% due to rework was deemed to be ac-
ceptable considering the uncertainty and complexity as-
sociated with FPSOs. When considering the potential for 
introducing optimism bias (i.e. over estimating the likeli-
hood of positive events and conversely underestimating 
the likelihood of negative events), the actual rework costs 
could be considerably higher.  
Cost growth was deemed to be a norm within FPSO 
projects. Having to undertake rework as a result of errors 
and omissions was an issue not formally recognized dur-
ing FEED within the previous organizations, where inter-
viewees had been employed. Even though post mortems 
from completed projects were used as a formalized learn-
ing mechanism for future projects, the inclusion of any 
form of risk assessment or even acknowledgment of re-
work was eschewed: it is a ‘taboo’ and its costs are buried 
within a project’s contingency sum. To the interviewees 
rework was not measured; it existed and occurred regu-
larly, but was concealed deep within an organization’s 
subconsciousness until a major incident arose. 
Industry’s unwillingness to admit rework being a 
problem was made blatantly apparent by a senior project 
manager who had over 15 years’ experience working in 
offshore environments who initially stated: “…we don’t 
have rework in our projects”. This shielding comment 
portrayed officialdom within the organisation they were 
representing vis-à-vis the individual’s personal thoughts. 
The mere recognition that errors occurred could potentially 
jeopardize the organisation’s corporate image and possibly 
share value. As the interview unfolded, the sincere and 
reflective voice and experience of the individual surfaced 
and it was clear that rework was indeed a costly and recur-
rent issue on many of the organisation’s projects.  
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If rework costs of 5% of CAPEX are an acceptable 
norm, there is a danger that this ‘norm’ will insidiously 
creep up further and settle in at an uncomfortable level, 
particularly as demand for energy and hydrocarbons in-
creases. Repeated occurrence of rework within offshore 
projects creates complacency and nurtures a culture of it 
being a necessary evil of doing business. The percentage 
increase in rework undoubtedly adds to an organisation’s 
overall costs. If rework accounts for 5% of an organisa-
tion’s regular work, this would lead to costs across the 
board being increased by 5%: i.e. supervision, cycle time 
for administrative procedures, answering requests for 
information and so on. The time element obviously trans-
lates into costs, which are then buried in what would be 
considered ‘normal’ operating costs. History suggests 
that those who fail to learn from their mistakes are invari-
ably condemned to relive them again. Insight gained from 
previous project(s) mistakes or oversights can be gainful-
ly employed in preventing future repetition. Learning 
from mistakes is difficult but continuing to make the 
same ones is far harder and certainly more costly.  
4.1. Rework causation: experiences from the field 
Table 2 identifies the factors contributing to rework in 
FPSO projects emanating from interviewee experiences.  
The number of times interviewees referred to factors is 
also identified, with the most common being denoted in 
Table 2 in bold.  Specific examples of errors identified 
included inflexible pipework design, insufficient gas 
compression capacity, inadequate isolation valves and 
leakages in the swivel. Many of factors identified in Ta-
ble 2 are interdependent and, therefore, are unable to be 
considered as singular contributors to rework.  With this 
in mind, it is necessary to determine the pathogens that 
influence these factors; these were derived from the dia-
logue and narratives that transpired and provided a mean-
ing and context for rework experiences.  
The push for ‘early production’ to capitalize on cru-
de prices was categorized as a pathogen of ‘circumstan-
ce’. However this behaviour was perceived to establish 
‘organizational impairment’ whereby actions within
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individual to task 





lations were incomplete 
C,T,P 9 Insufficient design audits,  
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5 Inadequate coordination 
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Key: Practice (P), Task (T), Circumstance (C), Convention (CO) Organization (O), System (S), Industry (I), Tool (TO). 
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projects followed predetermined plans and practices, 
irrespective of lessons learnt from previous projects. For 
example, a proclivity to fast-track the conceptual design 
and FEED stage often lead to poor scope definition and 
change orders occurring.  
A contingency sum for ‘design change orders’ was 
considered to be a solution for addressing problems that 
could materialize downstream during construction and 
fabrication. Despite being aware of potential changes, 
project managers choose not to alter their plans regardless 
of what ambiguity or uncertainty confronts them. Even 
though each project is bespoke, when decisions were 
required the most familiar plans and processes were 
adopted irrespective of whether they were good or bad 
(i.e. the passing of design responsibility from contractor 
to vendor for topsides to minimize risk). Underperform-
ing projects that incurred rework, were often explained 
away as being an isolated instance of unfortunate circum-
stances and were not considered to be conventional prac-
tice; an outlier event. Despite this outlier status, explana-
tions and justifications for the occurrence of rework, after 
the fact, were proffered to make the event appear expli-
cable and predictable. 
Fixed price contracts implemented within a com-
petitive tendering process often resulted in contractors 
being awarded work at the lowest cost where margins for 
error are severely limited. When an error arises one of 
two outcomes results; either short-cuts are taken or work 
is not undertaken with a due level of diligence.  Commer-
cial constraints imposed upon an oil company and the 
contract strategy implemented reduces its ability to pro-
vide management input into a project, especially in the 
case of lease-type contracts, as they can be kept at ‘arm’s 
length’ by the EPC contractor or vessel owner. Issues 
such as quality, interface management and resourcing 
may be abrogated. With a dearth of project management 
experience input throughout the EPC phases, the propen-
sity for errors and rework increases.  
From the experiences provided, the ‘circumstances’ 
associated with an FPSO project provided the impetus for 
other pathogens to materialize such as ‘task’ and ‘prac-
tice’ (Fig. 4). Under the nomenclature of organization 
(Table 2), ‘non-adherence to quality systems’ was identi-
fied as a ‘task-related pathogen’ that contributed to re-
work. It was revealed that short cuts were sometimes 
taken in order to complete tasks and issues that appeared 
to be purely administrative and were often over-looked. 
Fundamentally, people will break rules if they believe 
they can make work more efficient even when the reality 
may be very different. 
A leitmotif among ‘practice-related pathogens’ was 
the poor and untimely communication of information 
between the parties involved with the delivery and instal-
lation of FPSOs. As a result of schedule, people’s deci-
sions were founded upon a trade-off between available 
information and time. Information provided under such 
adverse circumstances often lacked accuracy and curren-
cy, especially when a ‘fast-track’ approach was adopted. 
One engineering manager reflected upon a topside con-
tractor who was provided with the wrong information for 
the turret configuration. Issues of interface management 
that arose oscillated between vessel and topside design, 
and topside/marine contractor and subsea. Inadequately 
integrated project team members and the exclusion of 
operations from key decision-making during the FEED 
were considered responsible for preventing feedback 
about errors on site being incorporated into future pro-
jects. 
 
Fig. 4. Interrelationship between pathogens 
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Conversion 2 ≈800 130 – – ≈55** 
New Build 3 ≈600 104 130 10 ≈10 to 15 
  * Duration refers to the construction period and excludes feasibility, engineering design and procurement. 




Fig. 5. Key factors contributing to rework for new build and conversion FPSOs 
 
5. Conversion and new build FPSO: vignettes of 
experience 
Several of the issues identified in Table 2 are contextual-
ized using vignettes for a conversion and new build 
FPSO.  The vignettes present an interpretation of several 
core rework issues that arose. The meaning and existence 
of rework is unequivocal; this critical issue must be ad-
dressed to reduce cost and schedule growth as well as 
improve FPSOs’ operational performance. As noted in 
Table 3, rework costs of 55% and 10 to 15% of CAPEX 
for the conversion and new build FPSOs respectively, 
were reported. Noteworthy, research has revealed that 
FPSOs that experienced significant cost and schedule 
growth perform better than expected during operations, as 
their final quality exceeded the original specification 
(Llewellyn 2011). In Figure 5, issues identified as con-
tributing to rework for the conversion and new build 
FPSO are summarized. 
 
5.1. Conversion FPSO 
A hydrocarbon reservoir had been identified but despite 
extensive computer simulation and modelling, a degree of 
uncertainty remained about its size and the quantity of 
crude oil to be extracted. Despite the reservoir’s uncer-
tainty, and having already committed more than 
A$100 million the recommendation was made to proceed 
with the project. The most viable and economic option to 
extract the hydrocarbon was identified as being an FPSO. 
The subsea system (which included elements such as 
Christmas Trees, Control Systems and Subsea Distribu-
tion Unit) was designed and constructed by an engineer-
ing and construction contractor. A twenty-five year old 
oil tanker was purchased for US$20 million from a ship-
ping company to convert into an FPSO; a so-called 
‘brown field revamp’. A contractor designed and con-
structed the topside facilities, the hull was modified in a 
dry dock and the oil company undertook the responsibil-
ity for topside integration. The FPSO was designed to 
produce 115,000 barrels of oil per day (Bo/pd). The ves-
sel was delivered on time and on budget to site but during 
operation latent errors began to emerge. Within two 
weeks of arriving on-site the vessel’s cables and risers 
were functioning and producing oil but less than 
65,000 Bo/pd of the expected rate was being produced 
with significant gas flare occurring. With any future pro-
duction increase, gas flare would have also increased thus 
exceeding the company’s regulations and the environ-
mental policies (to reduce greenhouse gas emissions) 
contained within their operating license. The excessive 
gas flare was caused by incorrect design of the topside 
process facilities but once it was contained, production 
subsequently reduced.  
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During conversion, the contractor decided not to re-
place the stern bearings, despite their short-life expectan-
cy, they were deemed capable of undertaking required 
tasks. However, within the first few months on-site, the 
stern shaft that had not been re-designed failed as a result 
of the contractor’s failure to adequately engineer for the 
FPSO’s harsh operational environment. The propeller and 
its components were adequate for covering long distances 
at a constant speed (i.e. trailing tanker mode) but not for 
slower speeds and idling for considerable periods of time 
while connected to the turret and mooring system. The 
FPSO’s engines are placed in idle mode to prevent it 
from colliding with the mooring system. When the FPSO 
is subjected to inclement weather (e.g. cyclonic condi-
tions) it can be disconnected and sail away. A cyclone 
was forecast; the FPSO disconnected and began to move 
out of its path. The propeller shaft seized because it had 
been sitting in an idle mode and it had not received ade-
quate lubrication, which in turn lead to seal and bearings 
failure. An operations manager stated:  
“This would have been easy to fix during the conversion 
as it was in a dry dock. It was overlooked. It may have 
cost more to install new bearings but now it’s going to 
cost even more to rectify. I guess rework in our industry 
is not cheap. It is serious dollars.” 
While the contractor overlooked replacing the seal 
and bearings, a project manager stated: “…if we’d have 
undertaken adequate risk analysis we’d have spotted the 
propeller fault.”  
Tugs were required to take the FPSO to a dry dock 
located thousands of kilometres from the oil field. Lost 
production was experienced and a dry dock had to be 
booked at considerable expense. The FPSO was redun-
dant for approximately four months. After two years of 
producing oil at a reduced rate, the bottleneck that was 
inhibiting production was identified and the FPSO re-
moved off-site again to a dry dock to be rectified. In addi-
tion, the separator and internal coalescers failed due to 
sloshing, yet suppliers did not understand the loads asso-
ciated with the separators. The FPSO was off-site for six 
months while it was debottlenecked and it was estimated 
that the costs of inspection and rectification were approx-
imately A$300 million. The FPSO’s topside design was 
significantly modified (e.g. new gas turbines) and when 
returned to site, the overhauled vessel could produce 
135,000 to 140,000 Bo/pd as opposed to the original re-
quirement of 115,000 Bo/pd. Debottlenecking the topside 
cost an estimated A$200 million of CAPEX excluding 
the cost of lost production. The topside was unable to 
function as originally required and had simply not been 
designed to produce the required 115,000 Bo/pd. The 
main separator had been incorrectly designed by the con-
tractor’s process engineer and thus an engineering man-
ager stated that: 
“This was our first FPSO, and it’s been a steep learning 
curve. But in essence, I guess our assurance and verifica-
tion processes didn’t capture the failure of the main con-
tractor’s design process. Rework was problematic – it 
was a totally unique experience for us and I guess for the 
contractor. Poor design, poor decision-making, and initial 
schedule and cost constraints provided a breeding ground 
for something to go seriously wrong.” 
Being the oil company’s first FPSO, considerable les-
sons were learned and all interviewees acknowledged that 
their own quality assurance and quality controls needed 
more stringent adherence. Emphasis needed to be placed 
on project governance and risk management. The increas-
ing use of a Front End Loading2 index goes some way to 
addressing this issue but in the future the oil company will 
procure new FPSOs rather than refurbished tankers.  
 
5.2. New build FPSO  
In this next example, a new build FPSO was procured as 
the most economical option for extracting oil. The oil 
company had learnt from its previous experience, particu-
larly with the unnecessary losses in production and profit 
arising from using a converted tanker. Nevertheless a 
series of different causal factors contributed to rework 
during the project’s execution and operation (Table 3). 
The new build FPSO was ordered to operate in deep wa-
ter (>350 metres) with a disconnectable double-skinned 
hull to comply with the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships. The FPSO was de-
signed to produce ≤100,000 Bo/pd and store approxi-
mately 900,000 Bo/pd at any point in time. It had five oil 
production wells, six water re-injection wells and two gas 
injection wells. During normal operations, oil, water and 
gas are extracted from beneath the seabed and piped to 
the FPSO for separation and treatment. Gas and water are 
reinjected into the reservoir for environmental reasons 
whilst oil is stored in cargo tanks, located inside the ves-
sel’s double hull. It is anticipated that the vessel will be 
located on-site for more than 10 years. During the design 
process issues associated with the number of drill centres 
required had not been clarified by the operator to the 
engineering team. Determination of the hydrocarbon 
reservoir capacity (e.g. average permeability, and compo-
sition of hydrocarbons) had not been finalised by the 
operator, despite extensive use of simulation and three-
dimensional (3-D) modelling. A project manager stated: 
“Obtaining knowledge about an underground reservoir 
costs time and money. It is a balance to obtain sufficient 
understanding of the next project’s development phase 
and trying to reduce time to get better results from the 
economical analysis, a process of uncertainty reduction 
and a process of opportunities through 3-D tools. It’s all a 
matter of risk; you can’t be 100% certain what a reservoir 
will produce. In all honesty, we weren’t certain.”  
Increasing shareholder confidence in the project was 
pivotal, so a decision to progress to the design phases was 
undertaken, despite the uncertainty that prevailed and the 
                                                                        
2 Key input parameters to determine a FEL index include: quality of 
engineering and scope definition, quality of cost and schedule esti-
mates, maturity of project management system and procedures, quali-
ty of project execution plan (e.g. contracting strategy, quality man-
agement system, risk management, etc.), organisational structure, 
involvement of construction and operations personnel, and stakehold-
er plans.  
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design brief not being signed off by all stakeholders. Data 
obtained from the subsurface was submitted to the facili-
ties engineer to develop the project’s specification, which 
was then used to procure an FPSO. A single firm was 
awarded the contract for the design and the construction 
of the vessel, however, a different firm was awarded the 
topside facility contract. The design engineers were un-
sure of the number of risers and umbilicals that would be 
required to interface with the drill centres. Without first 
consulting the oil company, the engineers proceeded to 
design the FPSO purely based upon the initial specifica-
tion and their experience. Work had commenced at the 
subsea level to determine the number of oil production 
wells and establish the field layout requirements (e.g. 
Christmas Trees and Manifolds). Work was suspended 
due to the uncertainty associated with the oil reservoir; a 
design freeze occurred. Computer simulation and model-
ling of the field was completed and a degree of confi-
dence was obtained regarding the production capacity 
that could be attained. The subsea layout required rectifi-
cation, which resulted in rework occurring. This rework 
created changes to the FPSO design which subsequently 
delayed the FPSO and placed contractors under pressure 
to accelerate works. In addressing the schedule pressure, 
the design engineers failed to undertake adequate design 
reviews and checks as part of its quality assurance sys-
tem. Errors in the hull and topside design emerged. The 
hull’s structural integrity was questionable and fears grew 
that any instability would significantly influence the pro-
pensity for green water loading to occur. This design 
error was not identified until the vessel was being con-
structed in its dry dock. Engineering was being undertak-
en in two locations: the Northern and Southern Hemi-
spheres. To expedite the design schedule, the engineering 
and construction firm utilised the design team’s office 
from two separate time zones. Each day, as one team 
finished, unfinished tasks were handed over to another 
team to progress. The vessel’s construction team had two 
different points of reference to seek clarification about 
engineering queries. Communication between the engi-
neering and construction teams within the same firm was 
limited and the need to integrate works with the topside 
contractor further exacerbated this problem. 
A gantry crane was needed to rectify the stability is-
sue identified. However, it was not available in the ship-
yard as it had been pre-booked for use on other vessels. A 
project manager stated:  
“If a crane was not available then it would have delayed 
us even more. We were on a tight schedule. What was 
more concerning was that we could only be in the dry 
dock for a fixed period of time. Other vessels were 
planned to come in. If the fit-out was not to be completed 
in a dry dock then it would have to be done over water – 
now this is also expensive, about A$100 to A$200k per 
day for an additional crane. Errors in logistics can be 
punishing and the stress was unbearable.” 
Another problem that emanated pertained to the air 
conditioned (A/C) accommodation on the FPSO; it had 
been designed for FPSOs operating in the Northern Hem-
isphere rather than in the Southern Hemisphere where the 
climate is far hotter and humid. This design error only 
became evident when the FPSO had commenced opera-
tions on-site. It was perceived that this design error could 
have been prevented if design checks and coordination 
with the topside contractor had been undertaken.  
 
6. Learning from experience(s) 
Understanding the organizational and project context 
within which FPSOs are procured is pivotal to error re-
duction and containment. The rework causes identified 
from the analysis of interviews were generally systemic 
in nature, a finding which has also been identified in pre-
vious studies that have examined errors in industries such 
as mining (Goh et al. 2012), nuclear (UK Atomic Energy 
Authority 1987), and shipping (Wagenaar, Groeneweg 
1987)  Strategic decisions, such as the choice of contract 
strategy and schedule optimism arising from production 
pressure, laid the foundations for deviations from prac-
tice, policy and process to materialize during construction 
and operations. Nonetheless, a dichotomy existed be-
tween the ‘individual’ and ‘organization’ in relation to 
rework. Informally, individual employees knew and even 
expected rework to occur but the organizational rhetoric 
denied its existence. In fact, many organizations that were 
approached to participate in this study were reluctant to 
openly share their knowledge and experiences of rework 
within FPSOs.  
The Norwegian Oil Industry Association’s3 (OLF) 
‘FPSO and ST Workgroup’, and FPSO Research Forum4 
have, however, been proactive in establishing CoP 
whereby lessons learnt about FPSO experiences are trans-
ferred and shared. Indeed, these aforementioned experi-
ences, combined with those from United Kingdom, have 
identified many design and construction errors that have 
adversely influenced FPSOs’ operational performance in 
the field. A UK report on the causes of FPSO errors went 
further by identifying technical specification in addition 
to the contract strategy adopted (e.g. interface manage-
ment) (Llewellyn et al. 2002). 
Learning about rework causation through interaction 
and participation with professionals associated with 
FPSOs is an effective learning milieu for its reduction. 
CoP such as the FPSO Research Forum can help to for-
malize situated knowledge and learning, although the 
extent to which it learns internally or imports new 
knowledge is in part a function of the nature of the prac-
tices it undertakes (Wenger et al. 2002). The situated 
dimensions of learning are concerned with its practical 
and social aspects within a context. Most people learn on 
the job in culturally embedded ways. This learning 
evolves through participation and interaction of people 
and their collective sense-making activities as they devel-
op competencies and construct their identities to function 
effectively. Interaction is therefore a prerequisite for 
learning how to prevent errors as it facilitates the sharing 
of experiences. This situated perspective may encourage 
                                                                        
3 http://fpso.olf.no 
4 http://www.fpsoforum.com 
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oil companies, operators, contractors and the like, to un-
dertake project-based learning and interaction so as to 
make ‘sense’ of their activities. Such learning should be 
undertaken at an organizational level as individuals may 
not automatically learn from their own experience. In 
order to learn, individuals need to test new experiences 
against existing knowledge and then consciously reflect 
upon what has transpired (Busby 1999).  The accumula-
tion of ‘collective knowledge’ is an enabler to systemic 
intervention by changing the conditions under which the 
individuals performs their tasks, so that design errors are 
reduced or eliminated in future projects.  
Some underlying issues can be derived from the re-
work experience(s) that have been collated. Senior man-
agement decisions are often influenced by environmental 
demands imposed upon them which in turn, influence the 
project’s resourcing capacity and the extent that policies 
and procedures are adhered too. Each participating organi-
zation has differing goals, objectives and learning capacity 
which may further compound embedded problems within 
project systems and processes. The project’s contracting 
strategy must, therefore, ensure that goal alignment is en-
sured. The EPC contracting strategy severely inhibits goal 
alignment between participating project organizations, 
especially when competitive price determination becomes 
a driver for service selection. Instead alliances with an 
inbuilt learning capability and performance incentives 
could be used to establish a proactive project culture that 
drives the behaviour of organizations to achieve successful 
project outcomes and reduce rework. The specific inclu-
sion of key contractors and operations personnel into the 
design and engineering process is critical for determining a 
realistic schedule, interfaces, and minimizing design and 
construction errors. Such an alliance may comprise of a 
competitive consortium of contractors who propose a 
FPSO design solution for a pre-determined fee, and if suc-
cessful, negotiate a contract price with the oil company. 
Specific details of how alliance contracts, based upon 
risk/reward compensation models, have been used to suc-
cessfully procure large-scale engineering projects can be 
found in Love et al. (2011b). 
Implementing strategies to increase production ca-
pacity, profit and ‘share price’ by unnecessarily accelerat-
ing activities can lead to rework, jeopardize safety and 
the environment. This strategic risk can cause a signifi-
cant ‘ripple effect’ throughout the owner and oil compa-
ny’s organization and other supply chain organizations 
which strive to meet the demands and constraints im-
posed upon them. Mismanagement, mostly people with 
no training in managing risks was identified as a basic 
condition contributing to the collapse of BP’s Deepwater 
Horizon (Bea et al. 2010). There was an explicit expecta-
tion that BP should have learnt lessons from the incidents 
that occurred at its Grangemouth Complex in 2000 (HSE 
2003), Texas City refinery accident in 2005 and the col-
lapse of the Thunder Horse platform in the Gulf of Mexi-
co in 2006 (Bea et al. 2010; Hopkins 2010). Lack of 
training, poor communication, poor supervision and fa-
tigue have been identified as contributors to BP’s acci-
dents (Bea et al. 2010). These findings are not dissimilar 
in nature to those reported in this paper contributing to 
rework in FPSOs. 
 
7. Limitations 
Using interviews, the research sought to determine the 
latent conditions that contribute to rework in FPSO pro-
jects. This represented a challenging task due to the 
commercial sensitivity associated with this issue, which 
lead to some interviewees being reluctant to speak openly 
about specific events. This naturally brings forth several 
limitations as far as the reliability and generalizations of 
the research results are concerned. 
When interviews of this nature reveal some of the 
complexities associated with delivering FPSOs, there 
often is a problem with representation. It is difficult to 
present accessible and realistic views of events that lead 
to rework occurring. For example, interviews were used 
to identify rework and obtain information about how and 
why they occurred. Thus there was a potential for inter-
viewees to intentionally or unintentionally conceal infor-
mation.  Moreover, there are often several different ways 
to present the same set of issues, each one of which is 
subtly different in its approach and emphasis.  This situa-
tion can make the findings derived from interviews diffi-
cult to summarize and thus contribute to the occurrence 
of situational biases.  
Another limitation of this research is the adopted 
perspective. Instead of trying to understand how and why 
strategic decisions are generally made within projects, 
this research has been first and foremost limited to an 
operational focus. Although the research has also taken 
into account an array of views along the development of 
its theoretical analysis, the main perspective from which 
conclusions have been drawn are from those who were 
generally operating at the ‘coalface’ within the projects 
sampled.  Understanding the rationale for key strategic 
decisions adopted by oil and gas companies would have 
undoubtedly provided a more fruitful and comprehensive 
understanding of the pathogenic influences contributing 
to rework. Building upon the research presented in this 
paper and the normative literature, it is suggested that 
additional descriptive case studies based research should 
be undertaken to further derive the conditions for quanti-
tative studies to assess the probability of rework.  
 
Conclusions 
Clarifying the causal nature of rework in FPSO projects 
has been the main emphasis of the research presented in 
this paper. Practitioners’ rework experiences were solicit-
ed and categorized according to the nomenclature of peo-
ple, organization and project. The key factors associated 
with the ‘project’ were the pressure to commence produc-
tion and inadequate interface management. In particular, 
inadequate interface management is an area that has been 
repeatedly identified as being problematic within FPSO 
projects. The use of specialist interface contractors has 
begun to proliferate in recent years. However, such a role 
simply adds another layer to an already highly differenti-
ated process of delivery for FPSOs. Utilizing an integrat-
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ed learning alliance with inbuilt contractual incentives 
may present a viable alternative contract strategy that oil 
companies could consider for future FPSO projects. As a 
result, this would provide a mechanism for stimulating 
the input of construction contractors and operations per-
sonnel into FEED. 
Under the nomenclature of ‘organization’ the distri-
bution of tentative engineering documents and unrealistic 
schedules were identified as key contributors of rework. 
In this instance, the interrelationship between these varia-
bles is evident; schedule pressure can lead to shortcuts or 
oversight taking place. With respect to ‘people’, stress 
due to workload arose because of schedule pressure, alt-
hough the industry’s prevailing skills shortage has con-
tributed to longer work hours for staff who strive to com-
plete tasks. While the lack of labour supply was not 
mentioned in the interviews, it is an exogenous variable 
that is adversely impacting the industry’s productivity. 
The pathogen of ‘circumstance’ stimulated the occur-
rence of influencing ‘task’ and ‘practice’ actions. For 
example, whilst competitive tendering may encourage 
lowest cost selection, it increases the likelihood that tasks 
and processes are not completely effectively thus provid-
ing a ripe environment for error propagation. 
The vignettes provide an insight into the experience 
of several specific errors that arose in a conversion and 
new build FPSO. Learning from experience(s) is neces-
sary to reduce rework in FPSO projects. The use of CoP 
provides a forum for situated learning to occur but the 
challenge is to ensure that learning is translated into prac-
tice. Formally recognizing that rework is a problematic 
issue that needs to be measured and managed presents an 
ongoing challenge for all parties involved in the engineer-
ing, construction, installation and operation of FPSOs. 
There is a caveat to the research work undertaken and 
reported upon here. There is the potential for bias in the 
experiences that were accumulated from the vignettes that 
were presented, as only the perspectives of the oil com-
pany were gathered. Moreover, the rework costs were 
‘estimates’ based upon intuition, as it was formally 
measured. In addition, a systemic approach to rework was 
undertaken and, therefore, the technical nuances of the 
FPSOs have not been considered. Needless to say, the 
research has identified an area that has received limited 
attention. More fundamental research and discussions 
with industry professionals in the future is required to 
obtain a richer contextual backdrop about rework causes 
and the consequences of rework so that effective mitiga-
tion strategies can be developed. 
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